

FEB 15 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Preparation of a National Psychological Strategy.

1. I have examined your memorandum of 25 January, together with the draft of proposed memorandum which you recommend for submission to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board in connection with the above-entitled subject matter. The proposed memorandum should not be addressed to the Director of the PSB, but rather to Admiral Stevens who is chairing the special ad hoc committee which was set up to arrive at ways and means of approaching the problem of developing a national psychological strategy. But what is much more important, the draft memorandum is not responsive to the request which has been made of us to come forward with our ideas and in its present form I am afraid would do little to advance the ball.

2. I feel certain that I have, myself, been at fault in not making more clear to you the nature of the paper or papers which we have been requested to produce. This entire subject is a difficult one to grasp, and even when the requirement is comprehended the task of producing an adequate paper in response will not be easy. We need not be deterred from the effort nor too much concerned with the perfection of our initial effort, since the paper is definitely to be regarded as a working draft only.

3. Accordingly, I should like to have you and your principle staff members concerned address themselves again to the preparation of a paper which would represent our contribution of ideas as to how this matter should be approached. I am much less interested in the quantify or composition of various committees to tackle various parts of the job (which is adequately discussed in your present memorandum) than I am in our substantive thoughts and recommendations. As an illustration of what I mean by substantive thoughts and recommendations, I attach a copy of a memorandum which has been submitted by the State Department to Admiral Stevens entitled "Phasing of ~~the~~ Operations Designed to Reduce and Retract Soviet Influence and Power." Admittedly one might take exception to the philosophies expressed in this memorandum or hit upon a different set of priorities. However, this paper is at least affirmative in tone and contains the essence of an approach to the problem which we are trying to solve.

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4. In recapitulation, I believe it would be the best approach to undertake the preparation of two separate memoranda, although you may find that the two will merge into one or that you would prefer to concentrate on the first as our initial effort -- to be followed by the second at a later time. The first memorandum could study the problem of the approach to a "national psychological strategy" from the point of view of our greatest capabilities, both present and prospective, as appraised by us. This paper would deal largely with areas and techniques, and the areas would no doubt in many cases coincide with the areas concerning which our Government is most worried at the present time. The techniques or methods would tend to be those of which we believe ourselves to be presently capable or in a way of becoming capable within the near-term future -- assuming the continuing determination of this Government to devote high priority and much effort to the application of our methods. There would be room in this paper for some discussion of other (non-covert) measures which would be required in order to provide a framework for our operations or to consolidate and guarantee the gains which our efforts might be successful in producing.

The ad hoc group, in suggesting this approach, recognized that it may not be entirely sound, but it was felt that such a paper from CIA is necessary if we are to have any clear picture of what might be accomplished through a concentration of effort in those fields where we have the best possibilities.

5. The second memorandum might take the form of a study of means which would prove most effective -- regardless of present capabilities -- in achieving ultimate American policy objectives as stated in NSC 24. Again, it is recognized that such a paper would contain a certain amount of unreality but it is felt that it would provide a useful background for the projection of certain ideas.

6. If any of the foregoing is not sufficiently clear to you or to the others who will be working on this matter, I should be glad to make a further effort to clarify the request. Colonel Philbin, who is working on this matter very closely with Admiral Stevens and the other members of the ad hoc group, has been kind enough to suggest that he would be glad to work with you or your people in the development of the kind of paper which we require, (since he has personally attended all of the meetings of the ad hoc group) to which he is in a position to provide important bits of background and the "atmospherics" of the conversations which I am sure I have not been able to get across in writing. I suggest that you take advantage of Colonel Philbin's offer of assistance.

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7. In view of the fact that Admiral Stevens informed me Wednesday of his intention to take about three weeks holiday, I feel that we have at least two weeks' time within which to complete the first (and most important) of the two papers.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

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Encl (7)

1. #2 of 8 of TS working draft memo for Adm. Stevens "Phasing of Covert Ops des'd to reduce and retract, etc." -
2. #3 of Nitze memo of 8 Jan. - TS.
3. Orig. of 19 Dec. 1951 TS Working Draft from PSB - "The Problem: To establish OPC approach", etc.
4. Copy 6 (of 9) of PSB working draft of 15 Nov. 1951; "To formulate a nat'l psycho. strategy".
5. Copy #13 of Philbin's memo of 28 Dec. 1951 and attch't: Memo of conf. held 19 Dec.
6. All of 6 copies TS 68173: proposed memo to PSB: "A Nat'l Psycho. Strategy."
7. #1 and #2 of 6 of TS 68172 to DD/P from Acting ADPC dtd 25 Jan. 1952 making certain points re proposed memo to PSB.

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